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The survivability criterion of a communication network
consisting of satellite and terrestrial radio links, is
defined as a number "m" of node-disjoint paths between any
node and the ground satellite terminal, assuming that the
terminals and the satellite links are highly invulnerable.
In this thesis, an heuristic method for finding the
required number and the locations of satellite ground ter-
minals and designing a low cost terrestrial network satisfying
a prespecified survivability criterion in an area with a
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In July 1977 Indonesia's second domestic satellite was
launched. That was part of the Government's major program in
developing a new communication system. The main goal of
establishing a new communication system is to provide a good
and reliable public communication system .all over the country.
Since Indonesia consists of many islands, stretching over
5000 km, then the system that will provide low cost, reliable
communication spanning thousands of kilometers of land and
water is a satellite system. Under this kind of system,
geographical conditions of the country will become a less
important factor.
The Indonesian Armed Forces, as an organization having
responsibilities of national defense and security, also needs
a reliable communication system that is able to support the
Nationwide Command and Control System. The existing high
frequency (H-F) military communication system does not pro-
vide adequate support to the Armed Forces to carry out the
mission due to the limited performance of the system. The
H-F communication system is highly dependent on the meteoro-
logical conditions. In a tropical country, where weather
phenomena are unstable, the H-F transmission is unreliable.
It is not unusual to have an indirect transmission of messages
from a particular military installation to the Headquarters

or vice versa. But the most serious disadvantage of the
existing H-F communication system is the poor security-
due to the nondirectivity of propagation.
To improve the existing communication system, the mili-
tary sees a possibility to use a satellite as the media of
its communication. The satellite system is considered to
be critical to national defense and security. It has some
technical characteristics that are ideally suited for mili-
tary purposes, such as high quality secure voice, high speed
data transfer, and real time accurate data processing.
Moreover, the availability of portable satellite terminals
yields three favorable aspects: less vulnerability, more
flexibility and greater coverage. Thus, whenever emergencies
dictate, access to remote and hostile areas not served by
the government system can be quickly established using
transportable ground terminals.
Considering the above facts, and since the need for
improvement of the existing communication system is real,
a new military satellite communication system must be
properly defined and developed.
B. MILITARY REQUIREMENTS CONSIDERATIONS
A military communication system is supposed to operate
under all environmental conditions or potential threats.
It must be capable of directing and monitoring peacetime
operations, providing tactical warning, directing wartime
decisions and monitoring the execution of the decisions.
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Due to these specific functions that must be fulfilled,
military communication systems must satisfy some additional
requirements beyond those for public systems.
La Vean [1] analyzes some requirements imposed on the
U.S. Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) . These
distinct requirements usually refer to some features that
must be fulfilled by a military communication system, and
it generally can be stated that they will drive up the
system's cost.
Since satellite communication for the Indonesian Armed
Forces is in its early stage, only three of the many military
requirements will be considered. They are:
1. Positive operational control
2. Survivability
3. Security.
Positive operational control means that the system must
be under military command and control at all times. Military
links are so vital that only military facilities can be
used to establish and maintain them.
The survivability of a military communication network
can be interpreted as electronic and physical survivability.
Electronic survivability is the ability of the networks to
survive from enemy's electronic countermeasures . This prob-
lem is technical in nature and it is concerned with the use
of sophisticated electronic devices. Physical survivability
of the networks is the ability to survive after an enemy
attack or sabotage. It is a function of the probability of
11

survival of the terminals and the links. To enhance the
survivability of the networks one might increase the proba-
bility of survival of the terminals or the links, or one
might increase the number of links between any pair of
terminals without increasing the probability of survival
of each link. One may also change the topology of the
network or use some combination of these techniques. In
this thesis only physical survivability of the networks will
be considered.
A reasonable measure of the survivability of a network
is the minimum number of links "m" that must be destroyed
before a particular node cannot communicate with any other
node. In other words, there must be at least "m" disjoint
paths between any pair of nodes. The number "m" is usually
called the link redundancy.
The security requirement is more technical in nature,
concerned with coding and decoding the messages, digitization
of voice signals, type of modulation and carrier frequency
used. It is also related to the communication media involved./
It was already noted in the previous section that the existing*
H-F communication system has a poor security and steps must /
be taken to improve it.
C. SYSTEM'S ALTERNATIVES
There are three system's alternatives that can be adopted
as the new military communication system. They have different
capabilities of satisfying the requirements discussed in the
12

previous section and they also differ significantly in
investment cost. These three systems alternatives are:
1. Complete dependence on the government system,
2. Full military system, and
3. Quasi-military system.
In the first system's alternative, the military installa
tions get access from the government's ground terminals
and use the links as an ordinary public subscriber. Notice,
that the government system is designed for public use and
it is administered and operated by the Directorate of Post
and Telecommunication. Thus they focus their attention only
to public and governmental needs. Hence it is clear that
none of the military requirements are satisfied by this type
of system. To adopt this system as a military communication
network will be an improper choice.
The second system alternative requires building a
separate satellite communication system strictly for mili-
tary purposes. This is the best communication system the
Armed Forces might have, but it requires tremendous invest-
ment cost. The cost consideration prohibits the Armed
Forces from choosing this sytem.
In the third system alternative, some components of
the system are operated by the military and the others are
under the government's control. To select which components
of the system will be under military control, notice that
the satellite is less vulnerable than the ground components
of the system. Moreover, the cost of the satellite and the
13

cost of putting it into an orbit contribute the largest
part of the construction cost of a satellite communication
system. Thus the best way to adopt this alternative will
be to use some channels from the government's satellite and
to build separate satellite ground terminals and terrestrial
networks strictly for military purposes. Under this kind
of system, the required investment cost will be reduced
significantly and the military will have a full command and
control over the more vulnerable components of the system,
i.e., the terrestrial network. A special protection to
increase the invulnerability of the terrestrial network can
be provided by the Armed Forces, once it is under their
control. Hence, considering the trade-off between the cost
saving incurred and the degree of control over the system,
to adopt this system as the new military communication
system will be an optimal choice for the Armed Forces.
Once the satellite is available, the new military communi
cation system might consist of satellite links only. In
this case there must be a ground terminal in every military
installation. Considering the number of military installa-
tions included in the communication network, this kind of
system will require a large investment cost, hence it will
not be considered.
Another approach for the new military communication
system is to build a satellite ground terminal for several
military installations, and then construct the terrestrial
network connecting these military installations to the
14

satellite terminal. This approach will reduce the invest-
ment cost required since it is not required to build a
satellite ground terminal in every military installation.
In this thesis, this type of system will be considered as
the new communication system of the Indonesian Armed Forces.
To enhance the security of the system, we will suggest
replacing the existing H-F links with microwave links having
a high directivity of propagation. The microwave links that
are commonly used today for terrestrial communication sys-
tems fall into two main categories, namely, line-of-sight
(LOS) and tropospheric- scatter links. The tropospheric-
scatter has some advantages over LOS systems when the
intervening terrain is accessible only with difficulty or
when sea crossings are involved, but its construction,
operating and maintenance costs for the same number of
channels and same distances are far more expensive than LOS
systems [2] . Since the tropospheric-scatter system does
not require remote repeater stations, then the survivability
of tropospheric-scatter links is higher than LOS links, how-
ever the cost incurred is significantly large. Provided
that the satellite links are available, then the advantages of
the tropospheric-scatter system stated above will diminish.
Thus, the LOS link will be used in the terrestrial network
of the new military communication system and special
efforts will be given to improve its survivability.
In this thesis, an heuristic solution method for designing
a new military communication network consisting of satellite
15

and terrestrial LOS links is presented with emphasis on
the survivability of the terrestrial network. The surviva-





To understand the problem, it is necessary to understand
the communication procedure in the Indonesian Armed Forces.
Indonesia is divided into four Defense Area Commands (DAC)
In each DAC there are several Military Region Commands (MRC)
of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The locations of DAC and
MRC Headquarters are shown in Figure 1. DAC coordinates
the joint operational activities of the Armed Forces in its
area. Thus from each MRC Headquarters there must be a
communication link to DAC Headquarters. Also from DAC Head-
quarters to the Department of Defense (DOD) in Jakarta as
the highest operational command in the Armed Forces. These
links are used to support the command and control activities
of the Armed Forces
.
Moreover, each MRC Headquarters should have a link to
it's respective Service Headquarters in Jakarta. These
links provide support to the administrative activities of
the Armed Forces. The two kinds of links and the communica-
tion procedure are shown on Figure 2
.
The existence of two kinds of links , operational and
administrative does not imply that there should be two
communication systems. Those links only show the hierarchal
procedures of operational and administrative activities in
the Indonesian Armed Forces and both can use the same system.
Notice that most of the communication links are going
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FIGURE 2. Communication Procedure
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highest commands in the Armed Forces are located in Jakarta.
In practice, it is also desirable for the DAC Headquarters
to be interconnected. These links might be used for a
direct exchange of information concerning threat, force
status and other ongoing activities. The connections between
MRC Headquarters will not be emphasized since there is no
necessity to do so. In the case of emergency, they will
always be able to communicate to each other via DAC
Headquarters
.
From the hierarchal communication procedure in the
Indonesian Armed Forces, the required connections between
Headquarters can be represented by an incidence matrix as
shown in Table 1.
The survivability criterion imposed requires the network
to have connections satisfying the incidence matrix in
Table 1, each with at least "m" node-disjoint paths.
Depending on the distance between the Headquarters, these
paths might consist of satellite, terrestrial or a combination
of both types of links. Assuming that:
1. The satellite terminals and links are highly
invulnerable,
2. The expected threat is from air or ground attack
using conventional armament,
then the problem of survivability will be focused on the
terrestrial links only. Since the MRC or DAC Headquarters
that cannot communicate directly with DOD or the Service






























rH ^ r-^ /
r-{ r-{ /
00








rH r-i rH rH r-i r-{ •-i











rH (N oo •^ in VD r- 00 a\
o
rH













redundancy "m" will be applied to the links connecting the
MRC or DAC Headquarter to the satellite terminal. The
value of "m" assigned to each Headquarters might be differ-
ent. To show this difference, the survivability criterion
of the military communication system will be written as
m. - the minimum number of node-disjoint paths from the
i Headquarters to some satellite terminal; i = 1, 2, ... 29.
Thus, given some information about the locations of
the Headquarters, the required connection between Headquarters
and the survivability criterion for the -networks and knowing
that the link redundancy will increase the system's construc-
tion cost, we define the problem as to find a method for
constructing a low cost military communication network with
a least m. node-disjoint paths from each Headquarters to
some satellite terminal.
The method must be able to
1. find the required number of satellite terminals,
2. find the best location (in terms of cost) for the
satellite terminals,
3. select which nodes are connected to which satellite
terminal (to cluster the nodes),
4. find a low cost configuration of the terrestrial




Given the location of military Headquarters in Figure
1, the incidence matrix shown in Table 1 and the values of
m. for all Headquarters, the communication network can be
modeled as an undirected graph with Headquarters corres-
ponding to nodes and links corresponding to branches.
To generalize the problem assume that we have a set
of nodes N = {N, ,N^, ..., N } and a required incidence
matrix. We are also given a set of possible locations for
the satellite ground terminals T = (T,, T^ / ..., '^^^ '
This set T must satisfy two basic requirements:
1. The location of satellite ground terminal must
guarantee a full support to the terminal to perform
it's technical functions.
2. It must have full protection against physical
attack.
Let us define the following:
N : the set of all nodes
N. : the i node
1
n. : the weight attached to N. , representing the
number of channels that must be connected
to N . to handle the messages that originate




g . : the weight attached to satellite terminal




^., : a link connecting N. and N,ik ^ 1 k
p., : the capacity of link i., in number of
channels
d. : the degree of N. , that is, the number of
links incident with N. .
1
The link redundancy m. for each node N. means that
the degree of each N. is at least m. . The degree of
the nodes will have an effect on the number of links in
the network, which in turn, will affect the cost of estab-
lishing the links. Thus, when constructing a network with
link redundancy m- for each node N. , we will assume
the degree of each node d. is exactly equal to m.
since this configuration gives the minimum number of links.
Hence if ST is a set of s satellite terminals, NM
is a set of n nodes having microwave terminals and SN
if the union of ST and NM , then given m. for all
N. e NM , the overall terrestrial communication network can
1
be modelled as an undirected graph with an n by n+s
incidence matrix X = {x., } , where i is the subscript
of N. £ N^, and b is the subscript of either N. e NM
1 M '^ 1





if there is a link l., betweenlb
N . e NM and N, £ NM or T . e ST




lb m. for all b subscript of N, e NM (2)
and T . e ST .
Since each node must be connected to a satellite terminal
either directly or via any other node, then
y n. < g. for all N. connected to T^ . (3)
( 1 — ^n 1 3
1 -^
The total construction cost of the network can be written
as
TC =




G . : the cost of establishing j satellite
terminal (T
. ) ,
I. : the cost of establishing microwave terminal
1 ^
at N . , and
1
C, : the cost of establishing link I.,lb ^ lb
25

The costs G. and I. depend on the size of the ter-
minals. Once determined, then throughout the process of
designing the network and computing the construction cost,
G. will be constant. I. , on the other hand, will be
related to the topology of the network as explained in
section IV. C.
The cost C, depends on the length of l., and also
on the link capacity p., . The exact dependency of cost
on the length and capacity of the link has not yet been
formulated. In most studies, the cost of establishing
a link is expressed as a function of one of these variables.
In this model, since length is fixed, the cost of estab-
lishing a link really depends only on capacity (one variable)
It is assumed that this cost is a linear function of link's
capacity. Then if c, is the cost of establishing link
£., for one unit capacity, the link's cost function can
be written as
lb lb lb
Thus, in terms of the mathematical expressions defined,




subject to y X., = m. for all N. e NM
-*
^ lb 1 1
and y n. < g. for all N. connected
V 1 — ^-i 1
27
either directly or via
any other node to T . ,

IV. SOLUTION METHOD
To solve the problem, one might start with predetermined
locations of satellite terminals and then construct the
terrestrial network. The difficulties with this method are
that the required number of satellite terminals is unknown
and also that the given fixed locations will not guarantee
the least expensive connection to the nodes
.
Another way to solve the problem is, first, to partition
the network, that is, divide the nodes into several disjoint-
subsets. By doing this, we will have to identify approximate
locations of the satellite terminals. Since in each subset
there will be a separate subnetwork, independent of the
others, the design problem of each subnetwork will also be
solved separately. However these problems are similar, thus
the solution method can be developed from one subnetwork.
The same solution method must also be able to solve the
problem in each other subset. When the problem in each
subset has been solved, it means that the overall terres-
trial network has also been determined.
A. NETWORK PARTITION
There are two approaches that can be used to partition
the network. They are:
1. to use the organizational requirement,
2. to use the geographical conditions of the area.
28

Under the first method, since each MRC Headquarters
must be connected to some DAC Headquarters , the communica-
tion network will be partitioned according to the area of
each DAC. In each DAC we would then solve the design prob-
lem. This method is good when the line of sight (LOS) link
between any pair of MRC Headquarters in each DAC is possible.
The second method considers the fact that a LOS link is
not always possible due to geographical conditions of the
area. For example, in Figure 1, the MRC Headquarters are
separated from each other by different terrain such that
LOS links sometimes are impossible. Thus the method is to
divide the nodes into several dis joint-subsets such that
these subsets can not communicate with each other using
only LOS links.
Using the second method for partitioning the communi-
cation network of the Indonesian Armed Forces, let us
define
R : a set of nodes that can not communicate using LOS
u ^
links to anything outside the set; u = 1, 2, ... r ,
where r is the total number of the sets.







since the nodes in each set R cannot communicate
u
to any other nodes outside the set using LOS links, then
the communication between sets must be provided using
satellite links. In other words, to satisfy the required
connection as shown in Table 1, then in each set R there
must be at least one satellite terminal.
The exact number of satellite terminals in each set
R basically depends on the total demand of the nodes in
the set and also on the size of satellite terminal used.
We consider three sizes of satellite terminals. Each size
is associated with the number of channels it is able to
handle. Thus, depending on the total demand of nodes in
Ru and on the sizes of the satellite terminals chosen, we
might have more than one satellite terminal in that particu-
lar R . Then the total number of satellite terminals
u
in the overall network will be the sum of the number of
satellite terminals in each R , once these have been
u
determined.
The location of satellite terminals must be chosen from
the set T such that the total realization cost of the
network is a minimum. For example, if it was decided to
have two satellite terminals in a particular R , the^ u
first choice might be given to the nodes having the largest
demands if they are also elements of set T . If they are
not, we would pick two elements of set T which are nearest
to them. If the demands do not differ significantly, then




we suggest solving the problem, and then to adopt the
combination having the least realization cost. The number
of combinations might be reduced significantly using careful
military and technical judgments.
In the case of having, for example, k satellite
terminals (k > 1) then each satellite terminal and the
nodes connected to it will form a separate subnetwork. The
design problem must be solved separately for each subnetwork.
In doing this we must first find a way to cluster the nodes,
that is to choose which nodes are to be connected to which
satellite terminal.
We do not consider interconnecting the clusters via the
terrestrial network, but it might be wise to do so since
this would allow one satellite terminal to carry the emergency
traffic if the other is out of service.
B. CLUSTERING THE NODES
The method of clustering the nodes is generally dictated
by the dispersion of the nodes in R .
There are two basic methods that we may use. They
are:
1. Minimal spanning tree: Construct a minimal spanning
tree connecting all nodes, then eliminate (z-1)
longest links, where "z" is the desired number
of clusters. For example, we have 11 nodes and the
minimal spanning tree connecting all nodes is given
in Figure 3. Suppose it was decided to have two
31

FIG 3. MINIMAL SPANNING TREE
satellite terminals, T, and T^ . We would
consider locating them at N. and Nq
respectively, and then eliminate the longest link,
that is l^r .56
2. Nearest- Neighbor .: the nodes will be connected to
the satellite terminal with the lowest cost of
connection. We can do this simply by comparing
the cost of connecting a node to different satellite
terminals. In the example in Figure 4 (next page)
,
we have 11 nodes. If there must also be two satellite










FIGURE 4. THE NEAREST NEIGHBOR
at N. and N^ respectively. Then by comparing
the cost of connecting each node to either T, or
T2 / we might have, for example {N, ^N^ ,N- ^N^. } in one






To decide which method will be used in a particular
problem, a careful judgment is needed. For example, consider
the nodes shown in Figure 3. If one uses the Nearest-Neighbor
Method to cluster these nodes, one might include N^ in
a cluster together with T, , N, , N_ , N , and Nj. since the
distance from T, to N, is shorter than the distance
1
from N^ to Tp . To connect N^ to T, through N^.
,
however, will be more expensive than to connect N, to T„
through N , since the distance from N^. to N, is longer




In Figure A, the satellite terminals are located more
centrally relative to the locations of the nodes. If one
uses the Minimal Spanning Tree method, one might eliminate
ii_o , then include either N_ or N- in a cluster together
with Tn . However, it is in fact better to connect both
of them directly to T- . Thus in this case, the Nearest
Neighbor method is more suitable.
The most important things that must be emphasized in
clustering the nodes are that the clusters must not overlap,
that is, their intersections are void and the capacity con-
straint of each satellite terminal as expressed by formula
(3) must be preserved.
Notice that each cluster will have exactly one satellite
terminal. Since the solution method for the design problem
will be developed in one cluster, then to simplify the
notation, through the rest of thisthesis the subscript "j"
in T. will be dropped.
The capacity constraint of formula (3) is not fully
applicable in the cluster with the node representing
Jakarta in it. The satellite terminal in this cluster is
used to provide connections between Jakarta and the other
nodes outside the cluster. The communication inside the
cluster will be provided by LOS links . Thus if Jakarta has
weight n and some portion of this weight, say n *
,a a
is for the communication inside the cluster, then the
capacity of the satellite terminal in this cluster must satisfy
(n - n *) < g . (6)




We already stated that the design problem for each
subnetwork will be solved separately, then the construction
cost of the overall network will be based on the cost
structure of each subnetwork. In the j cluster containing
one satellite terminal T and a set NM of nodes having
microwave terminals, the construction cost is
TC = G + I li + I ^ik'^ik ^"7^
-* N. eNM N. eNM
1 1
N, eNM or Tk
The link's cost C, can be computed using formula (5).
To compute the link capacity p., and also to determine
the cost I. we use the following consideration. The
demand n. of each node is the number of channels required
for conducting the operational and administrative activities.
In any case, this number must be preserved. Thus if there
are m. disjoint paths from N. to T , then in each path,
the demand n. must be satisfied. This method will have
1
the effect that in the worst case in which the network still
functions, that is, all but one path from N. is destroyed,
there are still n. channels available for N. . The demand
1 1
of any other nodes on these paths must be adjusted such
that they are also able to handle n. . In other words,
we define p., as the minimum required number of channels
in the link £., and the adjusted demand n. ' of node N.ik -^ 11
as the minimum number of channels that must be handled by
35

the terminal at N. . The quantity p., determines the
cost Ci and n. ' determines the size of the terminalik 1
at N. and its acquisition cost.
As an illustrative example of computing p., and n. ' ,
consider the network in Figure 5. Suppose i^ was
FIGURE 5. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE FOR
L .
1
COMPUTING p., and n.'
^ik
destroyed, then N-. must communicate to T via N^ and
N, and Uy niust communicate to T via N, . The capacity
of the links constructing the path from N- to T and the
capacity of the terminals on this path must reflect this
consideration. The terminal at N, must be able to handle
the messages going to and coming from N, , N^ and N-.
simultaneously. Likewise link £. must be capable of
handling all the traffic for nodes N, , N and N^ . The




By considering all possible cases of link destruction
in which the network still functions, the link capacities
and adjusted demands for the network in Figure 5 will be
n, • = max{n, / (n,+n ) , (n,+n2+n^) } = 15 ,
n2 ' = max{n2/ (n.+n-) / (n^+n-) } = 12 ,
n^ ' = max{n , (n +n ) , (n^+n^+n ) } = 15 ,
l^^ = max{n,
,
(n^+n2) / (n^+n^+n-) } = n^^ ' = 15 ,
l,^ = max{n^
,
(n^+n.) } = 10
,
^23 = max{ (n^+n ) ,n } = 12 ,
and
£^ = max{n- , (n +n2) , (n-+n +n^) } = n ' = 15 .
It is important to note that the capacity of a link
incident to the satellite terminal is always equal to the
adjusted demand of the node adjacent to it, or
£.^ = n^' . (8)
37

Once the adjusted demand of each node is computed,
the cost I. can be determined, and when the link capaci-
ties have been found, the cost matrix C = (c., } can belb
used to determine the construction cost of the links in
the j cluster using formulas (5) and (7)
.
The total construction cost of the overall communica-
tion network expressed by formula (4) then can be determined
as the sum of all construction costs of the subnetworks,
i.e.
TC = y TC. . (9)
D. THE ALGORITHM
There exist some algorithms for constructing a low-cost
survivable network. The algorithm proposed by Hakimi [3]
can be modified for constructing a least vulnerable network
under least-cost constraint when the cost of links is not
uniform. Steiglitz et al . [4] proposed an heuristic approach
for finding a near optimal configuration using a random starting
routine and an optimizing routine. The cost of the link in
their model is only a function of distance, thus independent
of the capacity of the link. Due to the differences in the
cost structure of the network, we will use a different
algorithm.
The algorithm used for finding the least-cost configura-
tion of each network is heuristic, and it begins with a
38

nonfeasible solution in which all nodes are connected
directly to the satellite terminal with m. links, and
modifies it until a feasible solution is obtained. We
then attempt to reduce the construction cost by employing
a "link-exchange" procedure.
By a feasible solution we mean a configuration of a
subnetwork having the following properties:
1. All nodes are connected to the satellite terminal
either directly or via other nodes
,




There are no parallel branches between any pairs
of nodes.
Let us define
NM : the set of nodes in j cluster having microwave
terminals
,
IN : The set of nonfeasible nodes, that is, nodes
having more than one link connected directly to
T
,
IN : The set of feasible nodes, that is, nodes having
at most one link connected to T , while the
remaining links are connected so some different
nodes,
L : The set of existing links.
It is clear that IN f) IN = and IN U IN = NM .
The algorithm is started by assigning all nodes to the
set IN so that each node is connected directly to T by
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m. parallel links. At each step, at least one element
of IN is transferred to IN . This transfer is made
possible by successively inserting a new link connecting
the node to be transferred, say N. , to different nodes and
at the same time deleting the link from N. to T and the
link from T to the node being considered for connection
to N. . We stop considering this node when there is only
one link remaining from N. to T . In this case N. is
1 1
not an element of IN anymore. Each time we consider
inserting a new link from N. to any other node, say N,
,
and at the same time deleting links from N. to T and
from N, to T , we compute the cost of the configuration.
We pick the one having minimum cost. For all nodes con-
nected to N. at the end of this step, each must have pro-
vided the minimum cost among all nodes considered. Then,
we update IN, IN and L by transferring N. and maybe
some other nodes from IN to IN , and add the inserted
links to L and remove the deleted links from L .
The step explained above is then repeated for the
remaining nodes in IN . When all nodes in IN are trans-
ferred to IN
,
we obtain a feasible solution.
Once a feasible solution is obtained, the next step is
a trial process to find a new feasible configuration with
lower cost. This is done by examining each link with every
other link. (The question is, if the examined links are
removed and we insert new links such that the feasibility
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is preserved, can the cost be decreased?) If the cost
resulting is lower, then the improvement is adopted.
As an example, let us consider a feasible configuration
for d. = 2 for all nodes as shown in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6. A FEASIBLE SOLUTION FOR d. = 2
1
The set L of this solution is
L
^ ^1T'^12'^23'^3T'^5T' ^56' *^6T^ "
Suppose we examine i, with respect to every other link
element L . Clearly 2., cannot be examined with i^2
since they both have a common point at N, . To examine
£, with £„- means to remove links l^ and {,„-. and
to insert ^, -« and a. . If this new configuration results
in a lower cost, the configuration is adopted and the set
L is updated, otherwise we examine i, with the other
links, for example, 2._ by removing l^ and i^ and
inserting i . The link 3 cannot be examined with
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£ since by removing 2.^ and 2, , an insertion of
either £, ^ or 2., ,. will result in a nonfeasible15 16
configuration
.
If any of the examinations above results in a lower
cost, then the new configuration is adopted, and the step
is repeated again with a new set L . The step is terminated
when all links in L have been examined and no lower cost
obtained.
The examination of links in the feasible solution is
actually an approach to arrive eventually at a "near-optimal"
configuration.
The algorithm will be written as follows:
1. Set IN = NM
IN = (0)
L , the set of existing links, contains only
links connecting the nodes directly to
the terminals.
Compute the cost of the configuration.
2. Pick any node N. e IN
a) Consider inserting a link from N. to every
other node in NM . Let N, be one of thesek
nodes. Compute the cost if we insert link I.,
and delete links for e. , £, e L .




b) If N. can be transferred to IN , update IN
,
and L and then if IN 7^ { } go to Step 2
for a new N. which is an element of the updated
IN . If N. cannot be transferred to IN
1
repeat Step 2 a) with every other node in NM
except N, picked in step 2 a) .
c) If IN = { } go to Step 3, otherwise go to
Step 2.
3. Arrange the elements of L in ahy order. Let
I., be the first element of L and ?,, be theih k£
next element to I.. in L .in
a) If a., and £, „ have a common point at T ,ih kji '^
and if it is feasible to do so, connect the
other end points if they have not been connected
and delete £., and 2,, , . If the other endih kn
points have been connected, go back to Step 3
for the next £, „ .k£
If £., and £, „ have a common point at, sayih k£ f f 2
N, , the examination cannot be executed, go back
to Step 3 for the next £, .
If £., and £, have no common points, delete
£., and 2., „ and insert £., and £, , or I. „ih ki ih k£ i£
and £,
,
if there are no such links and if ithk
is feasible to do so.




b) If the cost obtained in (a) is lower, adopt the
configuration, update L and go back to Step 3
with the updated L , otherwise repeat Step 3 a)
with the next j6, , .
c) If for all i,^ no lower cost has been found,
go to Step 4
.
4. Repeat Step 3 for the next element to Z ih
5. If for all £., e L no improvement in cost has
been found, stop the algorithm and adopt the minimum
cost obtained and the configuration associated with




Let us consider the following problem. Suppose in
the j cluster, the nodes are located as shown in Figure 7




FIGURE 7. NODES LOCATION
The link redundancy for each node is M. = 2 . Hypothetical
data concerning the parameters of the network are given as
follows:
The demand of each node:
n, = 3 n-, = 3 n^ = 4
1 3 o
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1. Start with initial configuration, IN = {N^^N^^N ,N ,N }
,
IN = {0}
The cost of this configuration is
C-j_^ = 3 X 4 = 12; C^^ = 3 X 4 = 12
C2^ = 4 X 3 = 12; 0^2=^^3=12
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C3^ = 3 X 1 = 3; C^3 = 3 X 1 = 3
C^^ = 4 X 1 = 4; C^5 = 4 X 1 = 4
6T =3x2=6; C^g = 3 X 2 = 6
TC = 4 00 + I 50 + I C. ^ + I C^i 400 + 250 + 74
i=l i=l i=l
= 724 .
2. Select N, as the first node to be transferred to IN
a. Consider inserting link £,, and deleting links
























The minimum cost is obtained if i,^ or £,_ is
£, - , transfer N, andinserted. Let us insert
N^ to IN , and thus now IN = {N2,N^/N^} and
IN = {N^.N^} .
b-1 Since N, could be transferred, let us take an
element N2 from updated IN . We now consider
inserting link
kT






















£_, is inserted, and we transfer N^ to IN
Now IN = {n^,N^> , IN = {N, ,N_,N_} .
5 6 12 3
b-2 Take N_ , and consider inserting link £_,





















£_- is inserted and we transfer N^. and N^
56 DO
to IN .
c) Since IN = {0} , we arrive at a feasible
configuration.
3. We write L = { l^^, z^^, i^^, i^^, i^^, i^^, l^^} and we wish
to examine £,^ and £_ .
a) Since i^ is also an element of L , then we can
only insert link 2,^ and Z^r) ^^^ delete £,^
and £ - _ .
_) /
The links' cost will be
C^2 = 4 X 2 =
C^^ = 7 X 4 = 28
,




C3T = 10 X 1 = 10 ,
C^c = 7x3 = 21 ,
C^g = 7x2 = 14 ,
Cg^ = 10 X 2 = 20
,
and
TC = 400 + 250 + 122 = 872 .
The cost obtained is even higher- than in the previous
configuration. Thus the configuration considered
here will not be adopted.
b) The examination of ?,,_, with respect to ^n '^ / ?.omf ^c^13 12 2T 56
£^„ also does not result in a lower cost,
b 1
4. The examination of £_ , £, 2 / ^2t' ^"^T' "^Sfi ^^'^ ^6T *^°^^
not result in a lower cost configuration.
5. We adopt the configuration obtained in Step 2b-2 as




In this thesis we modeled the integration of satellite
and terrestrial communication systems, without acquiring
the satellite itself. The model would be different if the
satellite acquisition is taken into account, and also if the
optimal number of satellites must be considered. There are
some studies by Yau [5] and Chou et. al [6] concerning
this type of problem. Both studies were created for
commercial systems, but could be modified for military
purposes.
The computations involved in executing the algorithm
will increase with increasing the number of nodes, but will
not be excessive for problems involving no more than 10 or
20 nodes in each set R
u
The approach used for computing the capacity of the
link can be modified by considering routing only a portion
of the demand of the Headquarters on each path. Thus
knowing the actual demand of every Headquarters , the problem
can be extended to find the best proportion of demand from
each Headquarters to be routed to each path such that the
construction cost of the links is minimized. Moreover, the
link cost function can also be modified so that it reflects
the actual condition.
In satisfying the survivability requirement, one might
not use the assumptions concerning the invulnerability of
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terminals and satellite links. In this case the redundancy
of satellite links must also be considered, thus there will
be more than one satellite terminal in each cluster.
Another algorithm must be developed to solve this problem.
Finally, it is hoped that this thesis will be useful
to those dealing with military communication networks.
Since the solution method presented is heuristic, an
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